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This paper provides a historical perspective on the current crisis, contrasting the old with 
the modern. We identify the growth of the nonbank financial sector (a shadow banking 
system) that was not regulated by the central bank or covered by the financial safety net as 
a key modern twist, compared to other crises. We also offer some lessons for monetary 
policy on key issues of liquidity, solvency, and the stability of the real economy. 
 
Resumen 
Este trabajo provee una perspectiva histórica acerca de la actual crisis, contrastando lo viejo 
con lo moderno. Identificamos al crecimiento del sector no bancario (un sistema bancario 
escondido) que no era regulado por el banco central o cubierto por la red de seguridad 
financiera como uno de los cambios modernos, comparado a otras crisis. También 
ofrecemos algunas lecciones de política monetaria en temas clave como liquidez, solvencia, 
y la estabilidad de la economía real. 
Michael D. Bordo 
Rutgers University INTRODUCTION 
 
The current international financial crisis is part of a perennial pattern. 
Today’s events echo earlier big international financial crises that were 
triggered by events in the U.S. financial system. Examples include the crises 
of 1857, 1893, 1907, and 1929–33. This crisis has many similarities to those 
of the past, but also some important modern twists. 
The crisis started in the United States with the collapse of the subprime 
mortgage market in early 2007 and the end of a major housing boom. It occurred 
following two years of rising policy interest rates. Its causes include major 
changes in regulation, lax oversight, relaxation of normal standards of 
prudent lending, and a prolonged period of abnormally low interest rates. 
Defaults on mortgages spread to investment banks and commercial banks in the 
United States and across the world via an elaborate network of derivatives. It 
has recently spilled over into the real economy through a virulent credit 
crunch and collapsing equities market, which will likely produce a significant 
recession. The U.S. Federal Reserve and other central banks have responded in 
a classical way by flooding the financial markets with liquidity, and the 
fiscal authorities are also dealing with the decline in solvency in the 
banking system following the template of earlier bailouts like the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation in the 1930s, Sweden in 1992, and Japan in 
the late 1990s. 
This paper provides a historical perspective on the current crisis, 
contrasts the old with the modern, and offers some lessons for policy. Section 
1 describes the crisis in a bit more detail. Section 2 provides some 
descriptive empirical evidence putting the crisis in long-run perspective. 
Section 3 presents some historical parallels and modern twists of the crisis. 
Section 4 discusses some of the issues in historical perspective for the 
emerging market economies. Finally, section 5 concludes with a discussion of 




1. THE CRISIS 
 
The crisis occurred following two years of rising policy interest rates. 
Its causes include major changes in regulation, lax regulatory oversight, a 
relaxation of normal standards of prudent lending, and a period of abnormally 
low interest rates. The default on a significant fraction of subprime 
mortgages produced spillover effects around the world via the securitized 
mortgage derivatives into which these mortgages were bundled, to the balance 
sheets of investment banks, hedge funds, and conduits (which are bank-owned 
but off the banks’ balance sheets), which intermediate between mortgage-backed 
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uncertainty about the value of the securities collateralized by these 
mortgages spread uncertainty about the soundness of loans for leveraged 
buyouts. All of this led to the freezing of the interbank lending market in 
August 2007 and substantial liquidity injections subsequently by the U.S. 
Federal Reserve and other central banks. 
Since then, the Fed both extended and expanded its discount window 
facilities and cut the funds rate by 300 basis points. The crisis worsened in 
March 2008 with the rescue of the  Bear Stearns investment bank by JP Morgan, 
backstopped by funds from the Federal Reserve. The rescue was justified on the 
grounds that Bear Stearns’ exposure to counterparties was so extensive that a 
worse crisis would follow if it were not bailed out. The March crisis also led 
to the creation of a number of new discount window facilities which gave 
investment banks access to liquidity and which broadened the collateral 
acceptable for discounting. The next major event was a Fed-Treasury bailout 
and partial nationalization of the insolvent government-sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in July on the grounds that they were 
crucial to the functioning of the mortgage market. 
Events took a turn for the worse in September, when the Treasury and the 
Fed allowed the investment bank Lehman Brothers to fail in an attempt to 
prevent moral hazard by to discouraging the belief that all insolvent 
institutions would be saved. It was argued that Lehman was both in worse shape 
and less exposed to counterparty risk than Bear Stearns. The next day the 
authorities bailed out and nationalized the insurance giant AIG, fearing the 
systemic consequences for collateralized default swaps (insurance contracts on 
securities) if it were allowed to fail. The fallout from the Lehman bankruptcy 
then turned the liquidity crisis into a full-fledged global credit crunch and 
stock market crash (as described in Kindleberger, 1978) as interbank lending 
effectively seized up on the fear that no banks were safe. 
 In the ensuing atmosphere of panic, along with Fed liquidity assistance to 
the commercial paper market and the extension of the safety net to money 
market mutual funds, the U.S. Treasury sponsored its Troubled Asset Relief 
Plan (TARP) whereby $700 billion could be devoted to the purchase of heavily 
discounted mortgage-backed and other securities to remove them from the banks’ 
balance sheets and hopefully restore bank lending. The bill was initially 
rejected by the Congress, but it was passed a week later after the Senate 
added on many politically popular and expensive items. 
In early October, the crisis spread to Europe and to the emerging countries 
as the global interbank market ceased functioning. The U.K. authorities 
responded by pumping equity into British banks, guaranteeing all interbank 
deposits, and providing massive liquidity. The E.U. countries responded in 
kind. On 13 October, the U.S. Treasury followed suit with a plan to inject 
$250 billion into the U.S, banks to provide insurance of senior interbank debt 
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Time will tell whether these plans, which are similar to earlier, mainly 
successful, rescue packages like the RFC in the United States in the 1930s and 
the Swedish and Japanese rescues in the 1990s, may solve the solvency crisis. 
 
 
2. SOME DESCRIPTIVE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE 
 
Today’s turmoil must be viewed in historical perspective. Figure 1 provides 
some background evidence for the United States over the past century. Panel A, 
from 1953 to September 2008, shows the monthly spreads between the Baa 
corporate bond rate and the ten-year Treasury constant maturity (TCM) bond 
rate. The spread represents a measure of the financial market’s assessment of 
credit risk, as well as a measure of financial instability reflecting 
asymmetric information (Mishkin, 1991). Figure 2 takes a longer view and shows 
the Baa corporate bond rate and the ten-year composite Treasury bond rate from 
1921 to September 2008. Also displayed in both figures are National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) recession dates and major financial market events, 
including stock market crashes, financial crises, and some major political 
events that affected financial markets. Panel B of figures 1 and 2 show policy 
interest rates —namely, the Federal funds rate since 1953 and the discount 
rate for the twentieth century. 
As can be seen, the peaks in the credit cycle (proxied by the spreads) are 
often lined up with the upper turning points in the NBER reference cycles. 
Many of the events, especially the stock market crashes and the banking crises 
of the 1930s, occur close to the peaks. Moreover, panel B often shows the 
policy rate peaking very close to or before the peaks of the credit cycle. Its 
movements roughly reflect the tightening of policy before the bust and 
loosening in reaction to the oncoming recession afterward. In the recent 
crisis, by September 2008 the Baa ten-year TCM spread reached levels 
comparable to that reached in the last recession in 2001–02 and above that of 
the credit crunch of 1990–91. The Baa ten-year composite spread was just below 
the spreads in the early 1980s recession after the Volcker shock and President 




3. HISTORICAL PARALLELS AND MODERN TWISTS 
 
Many of the financial institutions and instruments caught up in the crisis 
are part of the centuries-old phenomenon of financial innovation. The new 
instruments, which are often devised to avoid regulation, are then put to the 
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recently encountering. The rise and fall of financial institutions and 
instruments occurs as part of a long-standing pattern of booms and busts in 
the markets for equities, land, commodities, foreign exchange, and other 
assets. The cycle is financed by credit. Lending booms and busts and the 
credit cycle are also intimately connected to the business cycle. 
A well-known tradition in monetary economics, which goes back to the 
nineteenth century and in the twentieth century was fostered by Mitchell 
(1913), Fisher (1933), Minsky (1977), Kindleberger (1978), and others, tells 
the tale of a business cycle upswing driven by what Fisher called a 
displacement (that is, an exogenous event that provides new profitable 
opportunities for investment) leading to an investment boom financed by bank 
money (and accommodative monetary policy) and by new credit instruments 
(financial innovation). The boom leads to a state of euphoria in which 
investors have difficulty distinguishing sound from unsound prospects and in 
which fraud can be rampant. It can also lead to a bubble characterized by 
asset prices rising independently of their fundamentals. The boom inevitably 
leads to a state of overindebtedness, when agents have insufficient cash flow 
to service their liabilities. In such a situation, a crisis can be triggered 
by errors in judgment by debtors and creditors in an environment changing from 
monetary ease to monetary tightening. The crisis can lead to fire sales of 
assets, declining net worths, bankruptcies, bank failures, and an ensuing 
recession. 
A key dynamic in the crisis is information asymmetry, manifest in the 
spread between risky and safe securities (Mishkin, 1997). Information 
asymmetry promotes adverse selection and moral hazard, which are ignored in 
the boom and come into play with a vengeance in the bust. 
Banks played a key role in the traditional story because bank credit 
largely financed the boom, and the bust was often accompanied by bank failures 
and banking panics — events which eventually made the downturn worse. This led 
to the traditional case for the monetary authority to act as a lender of last 
resort and provide liquidity at penalty rates to the money market and discount 
window lending to solvent but illiquid banks. 
Countercyclical monetary policy is also an integral part of the boom-bust 
credit cycle. Bordo and Wheelock (2007, 2009) use data for the United States 
and nine other countries for the past century to show that stock market booms 
occur in environments of low inflation, rising real GDP growth, and low policy 
real interest rates. Before World War II, central banks operated under the 
gold convertibility constraint, so they inevitably tightened their policy 
rates as the boom progressed and inflationary pressure grew, thus helping to 
trigger the ensuing crash. The story is similar for housing booms and busts, 
but they follow a different cycle because of long gestation lags in 
  4construction and in the adjustment of prices to a collapse in demand (Leamer, 
2007). 
Stock market crashes can be serious events leading to a decline in wealth 
and consumption and a scramble for liquidity, which, in turn, contributes to 
incipient banking crises. Housing busts also have serious consequences for the 
banking system, via defaults on mortgages, and for the real economy, via the 
effect of declining wealth on consumption expenditure, the collapse of 
residential investment, and a financial accelerator effect as net worths 
decline. The recent housing boom in the United States was largely triggered by 
a long period of abnormally low interest rates, attributed to loose monetary 
policy in 2001–04 in reaction to earlier financial turbulence and fear of 
deflation and to a global savings glut (Bernanke, 2007). The bust was likely 
induced by a rise in rates in reaction to the inevitable inflationary pressure. 
 
3.1 The Nonbank Financial Sector, Financial Innovation, and Financial 
Crises 
 
The traditional financial crisis story depicts a shock to a major financial 
or nonfinancial firm, which leads to a banking panic as depositors attempt to 
convert their deposits into currency. Since the advent of deposit insurance, 
the source of the pressure has come from the asset side, rather than the 
liability side, of a bank’s balance sheet. One example is the Penn Central 
episode in 1970, when the collapse of the railroad led to a panic in the 
commercial paper market and triggered to concern by the Fed that it would 
spill over into the banking system. The New York Federal Reserve responded by 
opening the discount window to the money center banks to freely discount 
nonfinancial firms based on the collateral of sound commercial paper. Other 
examples include the Latin American debt default of 1982, when many money 
center banks became close to insolvent until a massive rescue was orchestrated 
between the Fed and the IMF, and the collapse of the Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) hedge fund in 1998, which also was perceived to be a threat 
to the banking system. LTCM was rescued when the New York Federal Reserve 
orchestrated a lifeboat operation by the New York banks. Historically, in 1763 
a crisis in the market for bills of exchange spread from Amsterdam to Hamburg 
and, like LTCM, led to the failure of the principal player and many others 
(Schnabel and Shinn, 2001). In each of these cases, the crisis broke in the 
nonbank financial sector and then spilled over or threatened to spill over 
into the banks, who were the ultimate creditors. 
Many of the financial crises of the past involved financial innovation that 
increased leverage. The 1763 crisis was centered on the market for bills of 
exchange, Penn Central on the newly revived (in the 1960s) commercial paper 
market, the savings and loan crisis on the junk bond market, and LTCM on 
derivatives and hedge funds. 
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3.2 Modern Twists 
 
Although there are many historical parallels to the current crisis, there 
are several unique differences. In the most recent episode, the financial 
innovation derived from the securitization of subprime mortgages and other 
loans has shifted risk away from the originating banks into mortgage- and 
other asset-backed securities, which bundle the risk of less stellar borrowers 
with more creditworthy ones and which were certified by the credit rating 
agencies as prime. These were absorbed by hedge funds in the United States and 
abroad and in the asset-backed commercial paper of the commercial and 
investment banks. As Rajan (2005) presciently argued, shifting the risk away 
from banks, which used to have the incentives to monitor their borrowers, to 
hedge funds and other institutions, which do not, increased overall systemic 
risk by raising the risk of a much more widespread meltdown in the event of a 
tail event, as we have recently witnessed. 
A key modern twist was the growth of the nonbank financial sector (a shadow 
banking system) that was not regulated by the central bank or covered by the 
financial safety net. According to Eichengreen (2008), its rapid growth was a 
consequence of the repeal in 1999 of the Depression era Glass-Steagall Act, 
which separated commercial from investment banking. These institutions held 
much lower capital ratios than traditional commercial banks and hence were 
considerably more prone to risk. When the crisis hit, they were forced to 
engage in major deleveraging involving the fire sale of assets into a falling 
market, which in turn lowered the value of their assets and those of other 
financial firms. A similar negative feedback loop occurred during the Great 
Depression (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). 
 
 
4. PROSPECTS FOR THE EMERGING MARKETS 
 
Financial crises have always had an international dimension, as Morgenstern 
(1959), Kindleberger (1978), and Bordo (1986) have shown. Contagion spreads 
quickly through asset markets, through international banking, and through the 
monetary standard. Stock market crashes and banking panics have often occurred 
in many countries within a few months of the original shock. A classic example 
is the Baring crisis of 1890, which started in Argentina and affected the rest 
of Latin America and other emerging countries of the time. It was triggered by 
central bank tightening in England, France, and Germany. This led to a series 
of sudden stops and current account reversals (Bordo, 2006) in the emerging 
countries and a number of banking crises and debt defaults. These events were 
echoed in the late 1990s (see Calvo and Talvi, 2005). 
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which contagion was spread by the holding of opaque subprime mortgage 
derivatives in diverse banks in Europe and elsewhere and by the seizing up of 
the asset-backed (mortgage-backed) commercial paper market. Pressure then 
spilled over to the emerging markets, especially those who were highly 
indebted to the advanced countries, with high current account deficits and 
significant exposure to the advanced countries’ boom, as in the case of 
Iceland, Hungary, and Ukraine (IMF, 2008, chap. 1). The IMF and the European 
Central Bank initiated rescues. Many of the Asian countries (and some Latin 
American economies) have avoided the worst of the crisis, likely because of 
the precautionary measures many took in reaction to their meltdowns in the 
Asian crisis of 1997 (for example, the build up of large foreign exchange 
reserves and a reduction in their exposure to foreign borrowing.). As the 
credit crunch continues and the recession in the United States and Europe 
plays out, the emerging economies that are exposed to foreign capital have 
been more strongly affected, as have countries that rely on exports to the 




5. POLICY LESSONS 
 
The crisis has implications for monetary policy on the key issues of 
liquidity, solvency, and the stability of the real economy. With respect to 
liquidity, the central banks reacted quickly in the Bagehot manner to deal 
with the freezing of the interbank markets in August 2007. The European 
Central Bank flooded the European money market with liquidity, as did the Fed 
in the U.S. market when it lowered the discount rate by 50 basis points. This 
suggests they heeded the first part of Bagehot’s lesson to lend freely, but 
not quite the second part of lending at a penalty rate. The Bank of England 
followed a strict interpretation of Bagehot until mid-2007, by keeping its 
discount window open to all comers but at a penalty rate. The subsequent run 
on Northern Rock on 14 September led to a large infusion of central bank 
liquidity and the announcement of a temporary complete guarantee of all U.K. 
bank deposits. The run on Northern Rock very likely reflects not the failure 
of the Bank’s lender-of-last-resort policy, but inadequacies in the United 
Kingdom’s provision of deposit insurance, the ill-thought-out separation of 
financial supervision and regulation from the central bank and political 
pressure (Milne and Wood, 2008). 
The pressure on the interbank market and liquidity in general increased 
during the winter of 2007 —08. In March, with the Bear Stearns crisis, the Fed 
developed a series of new programs for access to the discount window, 
including the Term Auction Facility (TAF), the Term Security Lending Facility 
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has also expanded its liquidity provision to the commercial paper market.  
These facilities reflected a change in the Fed’s tactics. The change 
involved the provision of credit directly to the financial firms that the Fed 
deemed most in need of liquidity, as opposed to delivering liquidity directly 
to the market through open market purchases of Treasury securities and then 
letting the market distribute liquidity to individual firms. The choice of 
targeted lending instead of imperial liquidity provision by the market exposed 
the Fed to the temptation to politicize its selection of credit recipients. 
This raises the question of why this complicated method of providing liquidity 
has been introduced when the uncomplicated system of open market operations is 
available. A second question is why the Fed has reduced its holdings of 
government securities. This will make it impossible for the Fed to tighten 
monetary policy when it finally decides to combat a rise in the inflation rate, 
since the only way to tighten is to sell government securities. The mortgage-
backed securities now on the Fed’s balance sheet are not marketable.  
With respect to solvency, the Fed and the other U.S. monetary authorities 
have engaged in a series of bailouts of incipient insolvent firms deemed too 
systemically connected to fail. These include Bear Stearns in March 2008, the 
GSEs in July, and AIG in September. Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail in 
September 2008 on the grounds that it was basically insolvent and not as 
systemically important as the others. One wonders whether the severe crisis in 
September–October 2008 could have been avoided if Bear Stearns had been 
allowed to fail. Had Bear Stearns simply been closed and liquidated, it is 
unlikely that more demand for Fed credit would have come forward. The fact 
that general creditors and derivative counterparties of Bear Stearns were 
fully protected by the merger of the firm with JP Morgan Chase had greater 
spillover effects on the financial services industry than would have been the 
case had the Fed appointed a receiver and frozen old accounts and payments as 
of the date of the appointment. Fewer public funds would have been subjected 
to risk. When Drexel Burnham Lambert was shut down in 1990, there were no 
spillover effects. 
Furthermore assume, as the Fed argued at the time, that there would have 
been a crisis in March like the one that followed Lehman’s failure in 
September. Would it have been as bad as the latter event? The moral hazard 
implications of bailing out Bear Stearns most probably led the remaining 
investment banks and other market players to follow riskier strategies than 
otherwise on the assumption that they also would be bailed out. This surely 
made the financial system more fragile than otherwise. Consequently, when the 
monetary authorities decided to let Lehman fail, the shock that ensued and the 
damage to confidence was much worse. 
The September 2008 crisis revealed that the deepest problem facing the 
financial system is solvency. The problem stems from the difficulty of pricing 
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commercial paper issues, or credit card receivables. Pricing securities based 
on a pool of assets is difficult because the quality of individual components 
of the pool varies, and an accurate price of the security cannot be determined 
unless each component is individually examined and evaluated. As a result, the 
credit market —confronted by financial firms whose portfolios are filled with 
securities of uncertain value, derivatives that are so complex the art of 
pricing them has not been mastered —is plagued by the inability to determine 
which firms are solvent and which are not. Lenders are unwilling to extend 
loans when they cannot be sure that a borrower is creditworthy. This serious 
shortcoming of the securitization process is responsible for the paralysis of 
the credit market. 
The Fed was slow to recognize the solvency problem. It emphasized providing 
liquidity to the market when the problem was the market’s uncertainty about 
the solvency of individual or sectoral financial firms. No financial market 
can function normally when basic information about the solvency of market 
participants is lacking. The securities that are the product of securitization 
are the root of the turmoil in financial markets, which began long before the 
housing market burst. 
The Treasury’s plan of 13 October 2008,  based on the U.K. plan to inject 
capital into the banking system, seems likely to help solve this problem. 
However, it is not clear whether funds will be injected into insolvent banks 
or into solvent banks that are temporarily short of capital. If funds go to 
insolvent banks, this can only prolong the credit crunch.  
There is ample historical precedent for the Treasury plan, including the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) established by the Hoover 
administration in 1932. Under Roosevelt, it injected U.S.$1.3 billion to 6,000 
banks, which is equivalent to U.S.$200 billion in equity today.
1  The RFC’s 
efforts were hampered in 1932 by the publication of the list of banks raising 
capital. This led to runs on these banks and unwillingness by others to 
participate. The current Treasury plan also has precedent in the Swedish bank 
bailout of 1992 and Japan’s long-delayed bailout in the late 1990s. 
With respect to the real economy, the Fed, with its dual mandate of price 
stability and high growth (full employment), did follow the correct policy in 
cutting the Funds rate as vigorously as it did. Considerable empirical and 
historical evidence suggests that credit crunches exacerbate recessions (see 
figures 1 and 2 and IMF, 2008, chap. 4). Given the Fed’s dual mandate, the 
risk of recession following the credit crunch seems to be a reasonable 
rationale for a temporary easing of monetary policy. Once recovery is in sight 
and once inflationary expectations pick up, it behooves the Fed to return to 
its (implicit) inflation target. 
                         
1. Richard Sylla, remarks on the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, PBS, 15 October 2008. 
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reactive policy to asset booms or move to a preemptive policy. The traditional 
view of monetary policy argues that central banks should act reactively and 
deal with the consequences for the financial system of an asset price boom 
after it has burst (Bernanke and Gertler, 2001). An alternative view argues 
that if an asset bubble (such as housing) is on the horizon, then the Fed 
should act preemptively to defuse it (Cecchetti and others, 2000). Bordo and 
Jeanne (2002) consider a circumstance in which the use of preemptive policy 
against the occurrence of a low probability event that could have catastrophic 
consequences, such as a national housing bust, can be welfare improving. 
Perhaps the recent events will convince the Fed to change its stance.  
An additional lesson speculates on the genesis of the crisis. The recent 
financial crisis likely could have been avoided if the Fed had not provided as 
much liquidity as it did from 2001 to 2004. When no financial crisis occurred 
after Y2K, it promptly withdrew the massive infusion of liquidity it had 
provided. By contrast, when it later foresaw a series of shocks to the economy 
that might lead to financial crisis, such as the dot-com bust of 2001 and the 
9/11 terrorist attack, it injected liquidity and then allowed the additional 
funds to remain in the money market when no financial crisis occurred. It also 
overreacted to the threat of deflation in 2003–04, which may have been of the 
good (productivity-driven) variety rather than the bad (recessionary) variety 
(Bordo and Filardo, 2005). If, following these events, the market had not been 
infused with so much liquidity for so long, then interest rates would not have 
been as low in recent years as they were and the housing boom may not have 
expanded as much as it did. Taylor (2007) thus suggests that interest rates in 
this period were, on average, considerably lower than would be the case based 
on his famous rule.  
 
5.1 Some Less Gloomy Lessons from the Crisis 
 
Finally, there are some less gloomy lessons from the crisis. First is the 
compressed consolidation of the U.S. banking industry. Since the 1990s, the 
U.S. banking system has been slowly consolidating to take advantage of the 
removal of barriers to interstate banking and branch banking. Canada and most 
European countries went through this consolidation by mergers and acquisition 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Evidence suggests that 
the U.S. banking system historically was both less stable and less efficient 
than its Canadian counterpart (Bordo, Redish, and Rockoff, 1996). The recent 
crisis has forced mergers and exits, thereby facilitating the move to a 
banking system closer to those of the other advanced countries, characterized 
by a few very large banks. Many smaller banks will survive, however, because 
of the legacy of community banking with significant local social capital. 
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1933, which separated commercial from investment banking. Since the act was 
repealed in 1999, the more lightly regulated investment banks, with their 
advantage of lower capital requirements, competed successfully with the 
commercial banks, inducing the latter to increase leverage and move 
liabilities off their balance sheets. The resultant increase in risk 
contributed to the crisis. The demise of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers has 
forced the other investment banks to merge with major commercial banks, to 
come under the umbrella of the Fed and FDIC safety nets. The creation of such 
universal banks has returned the United States to the system it had before 
Glass-Steagall and moves it closer to the banking systems in some European 
countries. Universal banks have a long history of stability and efficiency 
(Fohlin, 2007). 
Third, the extension of the lender-of-last-resort function to include most 
types of collateral and most financial institutions seems to be following some 
of Bagehot’s (1873) strictures on what the central bank should do in a panic. 
In describing what a Bank of England ‘s director said about its actions in the 
crisis of 1825, Bagehot states that  “ we lent it by every possible means and 
in modes we never adopted before; we took in stock on security, we purchased 
Exchequer bills, we not only discounted outright, but we made advances on the 
deposits of bills of exchange to an immense amount, in short by every means 
consistent with the safety of the Bank, and we were not on some occasions 
over-nice. Seeing the dreadful state in which the public were, we rendered 
every assistance in our power”  (p. 52). 
Finally, the monetary authorities in the United States and Europe responded 
quickly to resolve both the liquidity and solvency aspects of the crisis. This 
contrasts with the Great Depression, when the Fed did virtually nothing and it 
was up to Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Treasury to jump start the economy by 
devaluing the dollar in 1933 and purchasing gold thereafter. It also contrasts 
with the slow response of the Japanese authorities following the collapse of 
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Figure 1. The Federal Funds Rate and the Spread between Baa Corporate and Ten-
Year TCM Bonds  
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Figure 2. The Discount Rate and the Spread between Baa Corporate and Ten-Year 
Composite Treasury Bonds  
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